1 Epidemic Intelligence Service, Division of Applied Public Health Training, Epidemiology Program Office, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA.
2 Communicable and Environmental Disease Services, Tennessee Department of Health, Nashville, TN.
3 Department of Preventive Medicine, Vanderbilt University School of Medicine, Nashville, TN.
4 Knox County Health Department, Knoxville, TN.
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ABSTRACT |
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community-acquired infections; drug resistance, microbial; epidemiologic methods; laboratories, hospital; microbial sensitivity tests; pneumococcal infections; population surveillance; Streptococcus pneumoniae
Abbreviations: ABCs, Active Bacterial Core surveillance; CDC, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; DRSP, drug-resistant Streptococcus pneumoniae; MIC, minimum inhibitory concentration
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INTRODUCTION |
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Effective, affordable strategies for DRSP surveillance are needed at the local level to monitor disease incidence and antibiotic resistance rates and to guide empiric therapy (1). Active, population-based surveillance for invasive pneumococcal disease is sponsored by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC; Atlanta, Georgia) at a selected number of sites across the United States as part of the Emerging Infections Program's Active Bacterial Core surveillance (ABCs) (2
, 3
, 11
). This system effectively characterizes antibiotic resistance patterns by testing pneumococcal isolates at reference laboratories and is also used to conduct special studies. However, because of its costs and complexity, this type of program is beyond the means of most local and state health agencies (12
).
Knox County, Tennessee (1998 population: 367,000), is unusual because it is involved in ABCs and also has implemented a simpler, alternative DRSP surveillance system designed and conducted by the local Knox County Health Department. In addition, the Tennessee Department of Health conducts routine passive surveillance for DRSP. This situation afforded the opportunity to measure the alternative county-sponsored surveillance strategy against recognized standards.
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MATERIALS AND METHODS |
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The Knox County Health Department system was a "stimulated" passive system in which health department personnel solicited reports by telephone if hospitals seemed to lag in submitting their monthly reports. Reports included basic demographic data along with the specimen collection site and date. The results from hospital laboratory antibiotic susceptibility testing were supplied only when a patient's isolate was drug resistant. Except for one hospital that used broth dilution, susceptibility testing at the hospital laboratories was performed by using antimicrobial gradient strip tests. No additional patient follow-up or susceptibility testing was conducted. The program used discretionary resources, absent specific funding. After a Knox County Health Department medical epidemiologist established the system, health department personnel requirements were limited generally to the part-time efforts (1 or 2 days per month) of a communicable disease control nurse and an administrative assistant. Feedback to medical providers took place primarily via local publication of data and related articles in the Knox County Health Department's quarterly newsletter.
Conventional reporting. States typically maintain surveillance for a list of notifiable diseases and conditions (15, 16
). Laboratories, hospitals, and health-care providers are required by law to report the occurrence of these conditions to their local health department. The Tennessee Department of Health then collects and monitors weekly case reports by using the National Electronic Telecommunication System for Surveillance (17
); this passive system is referred to here as "conventional reporting" (table 1). In 1996, Tennessee adopted the national case reporting criteria for DRSP (clinical cases for whom S. pneumoniae has been isolated from a normally sterile site that exhibits intermediate- or high-level resistance to at least one antibiotic approved for treating pneumococcal infections) (15
). DRSP case reports typically originate with hospital infection control practitioners and include demographic information and the specimen collection date. Antibiotic susceptibility results were not collected, and no additional patient follow-up or susceptibility testing was performed. State-level data, summarizing the numbers of DRSP cases, have been published and distributed to medical providers by the Tennessee Department of Health in its bimonthly newsletter.
Comparison of the systems' quantitative attributes
For the present analysis, invasive S. pneumoniae infection cases were defined as Knox County residents for whom S. pneumoniae had been isolated from a normally sterile site (e.g., blood, cerebrospinal fluid, pleural fluid) during 1998. Residence in Knox County was determined from a review of patient addresses. Cases meeting this definition were ascertained by reviewing the total set of cases collected by each system.
Completeness of reporting. Cases with invasive S. pneumoniae were cross-checked between systems by using available identifiers such as patient name and address, date of birth or age, and specimen date. To estimate the number of additional cases not detected by either ABCs or the Knox County Health Department, capture-recapture analysis was applied by using standard methods (18, 19
). Completeness of reporting (i.e., sensitivity) was calculated for the ABCs and Knox County Health Department systems by dividing the number of cases in each system by the total number of cases derived from the capture-recapture analysis. Because conventional reporting included only invasive cases of S. pneumoniae deemed drug resistant, comparison with ABCs and the Knox County Health Department was limited to DRSP cases.
Antibiotic susceptibility. S. pneumoniae isolates from the ABCs and Knox County Health Department systems were categorized (2, 20
) as susceptible, having intermediate resistance, or highly resistant to penicillin (susceptible: minimum inhibitory concentration (MIC)
0.06 µg/ml; intermediate: 0.12 µg/ml
MIC
1.0 µg/ml; resistant: MIC
2.0 µg/ml); extended-spectrum cephalosporins (ceftriaxone disodium or cefotaxime sodium) (susceptible: MIC
0.5 µg/ml; intermediate: MIC = 1.0 µg/ml; resistant: MIC
2.0 µg/ml); erythromycin (susceptible: MIC
0.25 µg/ml; intermediate: MIC = 0.5 µg/ml; resistant: MIC
1.0 µg/ml); chloramphenicol (susceptible: MIC
4.0 µg; resistant: MIC
8.0 µg/ml); and clindamycin (susceptible: MIC
0.25 µg/ml; intermediate: MIC = 0.5 µg/ml; resistant: MIC
1.0 µg/ml). An isolate was defined as "resistant" to a particular antibiotic if it exhibited either intermediate- or high-level resistance to that agent. The sources of antibiotic susceptibility data were the CDC reference laboratory for ABCs cases and the hospital laboratories for Knox County Health Department cases. MIC values based on gradient strip testing that fell between standard twofold dilutions were rounded upward to the next standard dilution before categorization, per the manufacturer's instructions (AB Biodisk, Piscataway, New Jersey). Differences between the ABCs and Knox County Health Department systems in the proportions of isolates within particular antibiotic susceptibility categories were evaluated with the Fisher's exact test by using Stata statistical software, release 6.0 (Stata Corporation, College Station, Texas).
Timeliness and costs. Timeliness was assessed by comparing the median time between specimen collection with the completion of reference laboratory testing (for ABCs) or reporting to the health department (for Knox County Health Department and conventional reporting). Direct and indirect costs were estimated for 1998 on the basis of interviews with relevant personnel from the different surveillance systems. The level of effort associated with conventional reporting was designated as a baseline to which no costs were ascribed. For ABCs, the costs for this surveillance were determined by estimating the additional staff time required by hospital laboratories (e.g., for subculturing), the ABCs program's personnel and administrative requirements, and the additional costs of testing by the reference laboratory. Interpretation and analysis by CDC personnel were not included. For the Knox County Health Department, costs were based on the estimated staff time required by the hospital laboratories to assemble and transmit monthly reports and by local health department staff to enter and disseminate these data.
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RESULTS |
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For extended-spectrum cephalosporins, ABCs found greater proportions of isolates that were resistant (44 vs. 25 percent, p = 0.004) or had high-level resistance (30 vs. 13 percent, p = 0.002). The proportion of isolates resistant to erythromycin was substantial in both systems, although nominally higher with ABCs (37 vs. 26 percent, p = 0.10). For both clindamycin and chloramphenicol, similarly high proportions (>96 percent) of isolates were susceptible according to both reporting systems.
Timeliness and costs
The average time to complete reporting was approximately 4 months for ABCs compared with 1 month for the Knox County Health Department and 3 weeks for conventional reporting. The annual cost of the ABCs system was an estimated $30,000, including $25,000 for surveillance personnel and administrative costs, $2,000 for hospital personnel requirements, and $3,000 for reference laboratory testing. In contrast, on the basis of hospital and health department personnel requirements, the Knox County Health Department system cost approximately $5,000 annually.
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DISCUSSION |
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All three surveillance systems successfully recorded a comparable occurrence of penicillin-resistant pneumococcal isolates from usually sterile sites. Somewhat surprisingly, the Knox County Health Department system recorded more total cases of invasive S. pneumoniae infection among Knox County residents in 1998 than the ABCs system did. This occurrence was largely explained by the Knox County Health Department system including a hospital in one of the counties bordering Knox County, which was not part of the ABCs network. Geographically delineated surveillance systems will always have the potential to miss patients who seek care outside the catchment area.
As anticipated, the traditional, passive, state-sponsored reporting system recorded the smallest number of cases, but the difference was not large. Thus, conventional reporting appeared to provide an effective means of gauging the incidence of invasive DRSP infection. However, conventional reporting had a notable drawback. Because only DRSP was reportable, the proportion of isolates susceptible to penicillin could not be determined. Tennessee now requires that antibiotic-susceptible invasive pneumococcal infections also be reported, which makes the data more useful in determining the proportion of resistant isolates.
Differences were observed between the Knox County Health Department and ABCs systems in the proportions of isolates classified among some antibiotic susceptibility categories. Restricting the analysis to only those isolates tested by both the hospitals and reference laboratory did not affect these results (data not shown). These differences are unlikely to have an impact on the usefulness of either system as a public health tool. However, a potential clinical impact existed in those instances when the hospital laboratory reported an isolate as susceptible to penicillin and the ABCs reference laboratory determined that it was resistant; these types of differences are now under investigation. Similarly, interlaboratory differences in extended-spectrum cephalosporin susceptibility results have been noted previously (21).
The principal motivation for establishing these surveillance systems was the emergence of antibiotic-resistant S. pneumoniae. Few areas have successfully implemented DRSP surveillance, despite the fact that practical data exist in most community hospitals (22, 23
). Resources available for local surveillance are scarce. For DRSP, formulating the appropriate scope of a local surveillance system presents an additional difficulty. The ABCs system does not provide a suitable model because its considerable scope and resource requirements, which reflect its research-oriented role and national perspective, exceed local needs and capacities. The Knox County Health Department system was innovative in that it established a collaborative mechanism with local hospitals to assemble, monitor, and disseminate community-level DRSP data to providers in an efficient and timely manner.
Many hospitals compile antibiograms from the results of their own susceptibility testing. Typically, they do not distinguish between invasive and noninvasive infections, multiple isolates from individual patients, or intermediate and resistant interpretive categories. A surveillance strategy that provided community-level DRSP data from the aggregation of local hospital antibiograms has been described (12, 24
). Similar to the Knox County Health Department system, this alternate strategy also provides a sufficient body of continuous data to enable examination of trends and is useful in both the local public health and clinical arenas. However, the Knox County Health Department system provides a finer level of detail because it accesses the specific microbiologic and demographic data from individual patient isolates. Thus, this system preserves distinctions regarding susceptibility categories, patient demographics, and invasive versus noninvasive infections. In addition, because not all hospitals produce antibiograms, the Knox County Health Department approach might make these data more representative and accessible. Another recent example of alternative DRSP surveillance involved a sample of hospitals from Washington State (2
, 25
); this system collected periodic reports containing patient-level data on invasive S. pneumoniae infections, and it seemed to provide adequate, detailed monitoring of DRSP at the state level.
A heightened level of awareness exists in the Knox County community regarding the public health importance of pneumococcal drug resistance, and this awareness may have enhanced cooperation on the part of the hospital laboratories. It was not possible to evaluate the effect that prior participation in the ABCs program may have had on reporting through the separate Knox County Health Department mechanism. The existence of multiple, overlapping reporting systems in a given locale does raise some concerns, especially for the laboratory, medical, and public health professionals whose responsibility it is to actually perform disease reporting. Integration of disease surveillance systems has become a major focus in recent years, and the proposed CDC National Electronic Disease Surveillance System aims to provide an Internet-based communications infrastructure that will streamline disease reporting at the local, state, and national levels (26). Specifically, implementation of electronic data transmission from clinical laboratories should reduce the burden of disease reporting and may also facilitate collection of the detailed susceptibility data needed for enhanced DRSP surveillance.
In summary, the Knox County Health Department surveillance system for DRSP infections was accurate, timely, and simple to execute. This system did not require dedicated funding or the hiring of additional personnel. This surveillance system has been used to supply timely data to medical providers to define the magnitude and nature of the problem of drug resistance, inform empiric therapies, and monitor changes. Resource outlays have been balanced with a scope appropriate and relevant to local needs. The Knox County Health Department system could serve as a model for other communities concerned about the emergence of DRSP.
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS |
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NOTES |
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REFERENCES |
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